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Red-Teaming & Continuous Assurance for Frontier Systems

  • Writer: Paulina Niewińska
    Paulina Niewińska
  • 1 day ago
  • 2 min read
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Government baseline

The UK/US AISI pre-deployment eval of o1 shows public sector expectations: domain-specific tests (cyber, persuasion, biosecurity), red-team procedures, and publishable summaries. Pair this with NIST AI RMF (govern–map–measure–manage) for lifecycle discipline.






Your operating loop


  1. Threat model. List misuse risks by domain (sector + AISI domains).


  2. Adversarial testing. Run jailbreak and tool-use red-teams; include autonomous-agent behavior and data leakage tests.


  3. Decision gate. Approve; approve-with-constraints; or block pending mitigations (align with Preparedness v2).


  4. Monitoring. Capture prompts/outputs (privacy-safe), anomaly scores, incident tickets; update model cards or customer docs when behavior shifts.


  5. Supplier assurance. Require system cards and evidence of the supplier’s safety policy (FSF/RSP/Preparedness) at least quarterly or at every major version.


Metrics that matter (examples)

  • Jailbreak success rate (lower is better)

  • Harmful-output rate on policy test sets

  • Incident MTTR and recurrence

  • Drift alerts after model updates

  • Coverage of eval domains vs. threat model


EU/GCC practicality: EU customers will expect technical documentation and evidence of monitoring; DIFC/UAE buyers increasingly reference these norms while expanding AI infrastructure and licensing programs. Developing GCC-wide testing mandates. dubaiaicampus.com



  • Use AISI domains + RMF for an end-to-end assurance loop.

  • Bake release gates and monitoring into BAU.

  • Keep supplier safety evidence fresh and review it on upgrades.


Quick Q&A


Q1. Who runs red-teaming? 

Both supplier and you. Commission external tests for high-risk releases.


Q2. How often to retest? 

At every model change; at fixed intervals for critical services.


Q3. What counts as a “blocker”? 

Failing critical domain tests (bio/cyber/persuasion) or unacceptable incident trends.


Q4. Do we need user disclosures? 

Yes, where required (EU transparency), and often smart for trust, even when not required.



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